Chinese malign influence activities affecting UK academia
Executive summary
A report by a UK charity claims to have documented widespread malign influence activities in UK academia attributable to the Chinese party-state.
It is highly likely that the threat will persist in the medium term, driven by the challenge of developing institutional structures to identify the threat and incentives to downplay the problem.
Universities that implement tailored, proportionate processes to identify and mitigate this threat are likely to be perceived positively by security-conscious partners in government and industry.
SECURED is part of Tyburn St Raphael, a consultancy specialised in countering complex threats to organisations involved in research and innovation. Our experts come from UK government, military, and academic backgrounds. We help entities build tailored security programmes and protocols to fit their contexts.
We are experts at helping research organisations develop tailored, proportionate approaches to tackling complex security threats
On 3 August 2025, UK-China Transparency (UKCT) published a report alleging widespread Chinese party-state interference in UK academia [LINK]. UKCT is a charity that produces research on China’s malign activities in the UK. There has been widespread media coverage of the report’s allegations [LINK, LINK, LINK].
The report, titled ‘Cold Crisis: Academic freedom and interference in China studies in the UK’, depicts UK academia as subject to widespread malign influence by the Chinese party-state. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is termed a “source of systemic distortion for the study of China” that undermines the academic freedom and safety of UK-based staff and students [LINK].
SECURED is a security consultancy specialising in tracking incidents and countering threats to academia, research, and innovation. This brief summarises the report’s findings and adds context from with our own observations and other credible assessments.
SECURED perspective: malign influence in higher education
The ‘Cold Crisis’ reports findings (see below) show that malign influence activities are recognised by individual academics. In contrast, UK universities as organisations tend to lack the structures and processes to identify and track malign influence activities and other covert threats. Professional services functions centred around enterprise cyber security and physical security of university facilities are not postured to tackle covert threats operating on campus and online.
It is highly unlikely that there will be fundamental movement on this situation in the medium term. The UK’s higher education sector is facing substantial financial pressures and China remains a key source of funding for many universities. Changes in laws on academic freedom and the registration of foreign agents will take time to filter through the policies and processes of universities, and may complicate attempts to address malign influence.
Financial pressures and shifting regulatory environments create a situation in which universities have little incentive to invest in processes and capabilities that would enable the detection of covert malign influence operations. Universities can also point at inconsistencies in the UK government’s stance towards China as further reason not to be proactive.
In this context, institutions that put in place tailored and proportionate processes for identifying and addressing malign influence are likely to present a significantly more attractive prospect for security conscious partners in industry and government. This will include partners in the US, as the US government puts intensifying pressure on institutions over perceived vulnerability to Chinese malign influence.
Developing processes for systematically recording the kinds of malign activities described in the ‘Cold Crisis’ report is a first step for universities seeking to mitigate the threat posed to their activities and the safety and wellbeing of their people.
SECURED RECOMMENDATIONS
Assess exposure to Chinese party-state interference
Conduct deep-dive internal reviews with academic staff into perceptions of Chinese party-state interference and other covert activities.
Support at-risk researchers with tailored security provision
Researchers working on sensitive subjects face elevated threats. Institutions should consider concierge-type security models to provide welfare and operational support.
Engage external experts for security assessments
Security risks are evolving as universities and other research institutions are targeted by malicious actors using complex threat vectors. Engaging external experts helps entities to identify vulnerabilities in their security postures and develop tailored responses.
Key findings in ‘Cold Crisis’ report
The report focuses on the CCP’s efforts within UK academic China studies to shape the narrative about China. These efforts are allegedly pursued by repressing research on topics sensitive to or critical of the CCP while promoting its own preferred narratives [LINK]. The findings of the report are based on an anonymised survey prepared by UKCT, which was emailed to 469 UK-based China studies scholars and completed by 50 respondents.
CCP interference reportedly consists of pressure and harassment of UK-based academics. Methods include withdrawal of funding, complaints from CCP officials or Chinese students about teaching content, and coordinated digital harassment campaigns [LINK]. Such interference has resulted in modules being modified and cancelled and researchers resigning from teaching [LINK].
A general atmosphere of fear of the CCP and CCP-related groups in UK institutions is asserted in the report. The report provides anecdotal evidence that academics felt obliged to ban recordings of classes, and that Chinese students admitted they were asked to spy on campus events [LINK].
The report identifies UK universities’ financial dependence on Chinese funding and tuition fees as enabling interference. 64% of respondents thought that financial dependency on Chinese tuition fees informed institutions’ policies towards China [LINK]. Financial dependency enables direct and indirect pressure as the fear of CCP intervention has reportedly led some university administrators to pre-emptively suppress perceived risks.
Cold Crisis acknowledges that finding a solution to Chinese state interference in UK academia is extremely difficult. New legislation, such as the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 [LINK] and The National Security Act 2023 [LINK], provide legal scope to combat Chinese interference and espionage. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains unclear, particularly given increasing UK academic financial dependence on Chinese tuition fees.
The report warns that as a consequence of this interference the next generation educated in the UK may develop a distorted understanding of China [LINK]. This risks shaping future government and business policies in ways that strengthen China’s strategic position.
How does ‘Cold Crisis’ align with other reporting?
The report’s thematic conclusions are consistent with other credible assessments and with SECURED’s observations of Chinese state influence in the UK and, more broadly, Western academia.
Controlling the narrative of debate about China within UK universities was identified as a key CCP strategic objective by the UK Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on China in 2023 [LINK]. Reports by the Human Rights Clinic at Ghent University and the US Hoover Institution describe how this strategy extends beyond the UK, with CCP influence apparent in Europe and US [LINK, LINK].
Chinese students, Students and Scholars Associations, think tanks, and Confucius Institutes are consistently identified as mechanisms of Chinese state interference [LINK, LINK, LINK, LINK, LINK].
Reports emphasise the strategic dependence of UK and Western institutions on Chinese student tuition fees and funding, which provides leverage for Chinese state interference [LINK]. This strategic dependence has increased, with Chinese students the largest contingent of international students and generating an estimated £5.5 billion in fees in 2024 [LINK, LINK].
The US government has introduced several countermeasures, including increased vetting for Chinese students [LINK], requirements for US institutions to cut affiliations with Chinese funding bodies [LINK], and sanctions on Chinese education institutions linked to the Chinese military [LINK]. UK policy is significantly weaker. The 2023 UK Parliament report identifies significant challenges in implementing an effective whole-of-government response to the threat posed by China [LINK].
