Dependence on US technologies: a new geopolitical exposure
Executive summary
The Trump administration’s actions over Greenland have exposed the strategic vulnerability created by dependence on US technology.
This dependence could be exploited in several ways by the Trump administration, ranging from the suspension of shared government systems to orders banning US companies from providing some services.
Disruption caused by a loss of access to US technology would be significant and vary by entity. Organisations who understand their exposure to US geopolitical risk and technological dependence will be better equipped to manage and mitigate associated risks.
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The US: an increasingly unstable ally
The relationship between the US and its allies in Europe and NATO is changing rapidly. This was epitomised by US President Donald Trump’s demands for the Danish territory of Greenland in January 2026 [LINK]. US allies such as the UK, France, and Canada loudly criticised the Trump administration’s repeated crossing of diplomatic “red lines” over Greenland [LINK].
Amid this concern, European leaders have voiced concern over their dependence on US technology. Over 80% of Europe’s digital products and services are imported, with US providers overwhelmingly dominant, particularly in cloud computing where they control roughly 83% of the market [LINK, LINK].
Trump’s increasingly polarising and aggressive approach has rendered more plausible the prospect of the US weaponising this dependence. European states have begun assessing the extent of this dependence and prospects for decoupling from the US.
What could the US do to weaponise tech dependence
The Trump administration could weaponise Europe’s dependence on US technology in several ways.
The first, and most plausible, would be direct orders from the administration which cut off access to US government-operated systems. There is historical precedent for this approach: in March 2025, the Trump administration suspended intelligence provision to Ukraine following a rift between Trump and Zelensky [LINK].
Cutoffs would likely be deployed as a short-term coercive tool, access temporarily withdrawn and then restored, to exert strategic pressure. Even a brief interruption would cause significant operational disruption for NATO allies reliant on US systems for intelligence collection and the operation of defence assets.
Ordering US defence contractors and technology providers, such as Microsoft and Google, to cease provision of services to other countries is another potential mechanism at Trump’s disposal. This would likely require some form of executive order from the Trump administration or persuasion to enforce this decision.
How Trump would persuade US technology companies to cease their services to certain countries is hard to predict, given commercial and legal considerations. However, given Trump’s historic affiliation with the US technology oligarchs, it is possible that this would involve some form of financial compensation, such as digital tariffs on certain US technologies with a large percentage of tariff revenue designated to flow into the US technology companies themselves to offset the market share loss.
Assessing the likelihood of Trump adopting the second option, the form such orders would take, the companies’ reaction, and the timescales involved is challenging. The scale of impact itself would vary significantly depending on which US technologies were restricted. A suspension of core platforms such as Microsoft or Oracle would cause systemic disruption across governments and wider economies, whereas restricting access to more specialised capabilities, such as Maxar Technologies' satellite imagery, would be damaging but far less disruptive. The level of disruption would ultimately vary by entity.
National security dependence on US technology
In the UK and European public sectors, rapidly decoupling from US technology would be extremely challenging as US technologies underpin numerous critical national security functions. Europe’s national security systems are so deeply integrated with US technologies that decoupling would be extremely difficult and a rapid decoupling would be effectively impossible without significantly degrading defence capability.
US technology is highly integrated into NATO militaries. Many European nations rely on US-manufactured military hardware, such as the F-35, and the software required to operationalise these military assets [LINK, LINK]. Europe’s defence industry has struggled to produce comparable platforms and systems.
US software and technology are highly integrated into European national security systems and operations. European governments rely on GPS and navigation systems provided by US space-based ICT technologies, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and US Maritime Safety and Security Information Systems (MSSIS) for intelligence collection and the operation of national security systems [LINK, LINK].
The prospect of a US ‘kill-switch’ poses a plausible and immediate strategic vulnerability for entities involved with national security. This is an area where there is more scope for Trump to act directly. Mitigation for NATO countries would likely involve long-term significant investment into European defence industries to develop systems and capabilities able to operate without US support. Some European leaders may attempt to ‘wait out’ the Trump administration and hope that diplomatic norms return in the following administration. However, this is a risk that some countries will be unwilling to take.
Daily operations
Beyond national security concerns, dependence on US technologies threatens the functioning of daily operations in the private and public sectors. The vast majority of European private and public entities rely on cloud software provided by US hyperscalers, with Amazon, Microsoft, and Google controlling 65% of the European cloud market [LINK].
European institutions rely on these digital products for core functions like email, cloud computing, and data management, with significant investment in both time and resources spent into optimising these services for operational requirements.
In a scenario where the US cut off access to these services, the public sector and private entities would face immediate issues in workflow and productivity. The loss of access to US-hosted email, data, collaboration tools, bespoke software, and AI systems would inhibit daily operational functions, fundamentally change communication patterns, create immediate issues with secure storage of data, and break workflows dependent on AI.
There are European cloud service alternatives, such as OVHcloud [LINK], STACKIT [LINK], CysoCloud [LINK], Scaleaway [LINK], and Open Telekom Cloud [LINK]. However, they remain fragmented and lack the scale, integration, data-centre capacity required to absorb a rapid, system-wide migration from US providers [LINK]. Microsoft, Meta, and Google spent approximately USD80 billion in Q3 in 2025 alone on data centres and other networks for AI [LINK]. The EU’s January 2026 pledge to invest EU40 million in the ‘Open Internet Stack Initiative’ appears miniscule by comparison [LINK]. European alternatives are unlikely to be able to support a rapid transition given the significantly smaller infrastructural investments.
SECURED Recommendations
Use external geopolitical reporting to monitor and assess exposure to geopolitical risk associated with US
The geopolitical landscape is increasingly fluid and unpredictable, transforming previously low-risk dependencies into high-risk exposure. External reporting and analysis can provide institutions with timely, actionable intelligence to support proactive decision-making and early risk mitigation.
Conduct assessments of key dependencies on US technologies
Structured assessments of key dependencies can identify which systems, platforms, and workflows are most vulnerable if access is disrupted.
Identify UK and European alternatives to build redundancy
Identifying potential alternative services supports contingency planning and reduces risk from geopolitical exposure to dependence on US technologies.
