The Zimmermann Telegram: A Century-Old Case Study for Strategic Communications

In January 1917, Arthur Zimmermann, Germany’s Foreign Minister, transmitted an encrypted telegram to the German ambassador in Washington. What followed would become one of the most famous diplomatic and intelligence episodes during the First World War (WWI), with consequences Germany had not foreseen.

Zimmerman’s telegram outlined a bombshell: Germany’s recommencement of an unrestricted submarine campaign in the Atlantic and a proposal of an alliance with Mexico against the US. 

However, the Telegram failed to reach its intended audience securely. Instead, it was intercepted and deciphered by Room 40, a secretive unit within British Naval Intelligence. Britain then carefully crafted how and when to disclose the Telegram to the US government, ultimately persuading President Woodrow Wilson to lead the US into WWI.

Britain was thus able to reverse the intended outcome of the Zimmerman Telegram to its advantage by strengthening Britain’s strategic positioning in WWI.

Often viewed as a diplomatic blunder or outright stupid, the Zimmermann Telegram looks very different when analysed through the lens of intelligence, security, and information competition.

Campaigning to lay the foundation

Strategic communications was historically grounded in political, military, and diplomatic spheres. Its contemporary application spans a broad range of sectors, including corporate communications, public relations, digital strategy, and crisis management. 

The Zimmermann Telegram illustrates how intelligence and strategic communications can be mutually reinforcing when part of a sustained, integrated campaign. Britain’s success was not accidental — it was built on years of groundwork in intelligence gathering, information security, and strategic narrative shaping. 

At the outbreak of WWI, Britain severed Germany’s Atlantic telegraphic cables, forcing Germany to reroute its transatlantic communications through neutral diplomatic channels – primarily those of the US. This immediate strategic advantage was compounded by Britain’s aggressive campaign to expand and secure its subsea cable network in the decades prior, establishing a near monopoly over the production, maintenance and routing of Atlantic cables.

Intelligence and security as enabling functions

This long-term campaigning approach meant that Britain was well-placed to intercept and decrypt the Zimmerman Telegram. 

By herding the Germans to communicate via the US diplomatic cables – which Britain could monitor – Britain used second-order effects to shape the information environment in their favour. This strategic positioning was key to Room 40’s collection of the Zimmerman Telegram.

The expansion of the British intelligence network was another way Britain worked to seize the initiative in the information environment. Capitalising on an opportunity in Mexico, Britain expanded its intelligence agent network in North America, notably by recruiting an agent in the Mexican telegraph office. 

This proved decisive: the British agent Mexico secured a copy of the Zimmermann Telegram in a weaker encryption code, enabling Room 40 to fully decrypt the stronger code used when Britain first intercepted the Telegram.

The strength of Britain’s intelligence capabilities, and the weaknesses in German security, created a virtuous circle (from the British perspective), cementing their advantage in the information environment. 

The importance of sensemaking

Germany’s intelligence apparatus suffered from several blind spots that meant it lacked broad situational awareness of the information environment. It lacked robust geopolitical understanding outside Europe, especially in the United States. 

Had the Germans conducted systematic open source intelligence collection in the US, which they were already conducting elsewhere, they would have realised that their communication encryption had been broken repeatedly, as excerpts were regularly released to the US press. 

In contrast, Britain’s intelligence operations were guided by nuanced sensemaking. They understood not just what messages to release, but how, when, and to whom. British strategists identified key influencers — including President Wilson and sympathetic U.S. officials — and tailored the narrative accordingly.

Conscious of prevailing anti-English sentiment, British intelligence crafted a layered deception campaign to conceal that they had monitored and intercepted the Telegram on transit via the US diplomatic telegraphic cables. Often framed negatively, deception can be used for defence. 

Recognising that President Wilson was the key political figure to target, British strategists tailored a narrative that avoided triggering widespread anti-English sentiment in the US. This strategic messaging helped convince Wilson that Germany was neither committed to peace nor a trustworthy actor.

Initiative persistence in the information environment

The Zimmermann Telegram is more than just a wartime curiosity; it exemplifies initiative persistence. This is the principle that actors achieve security by persistently shaping the security and information environment in their favor, anticipating adversary moves and disrupting them proactively.

Britain’s success in the Zimmermann affair derived from its ability to seize and sustain the initiative in the information environment, leveraging marginal gains in intelligence, security, and strategic communications to both shape this environment and align operations with strategic outcomes. 

Britain’s actions — from cable-cutting and cryptanalysis to global intelligence expansion and narrative control — were not isolated. They were parts of ongoing campaigning to gain strategic advantage.

This was what we would now identify as initiative persistence in action: continuous campaigning aligned to strategic objectives to shape outcomes long before a single decision point arrives. The Zimmermann episode is an early example of how campaigning can translate into strategic advantage.

Strategic Comms in the Digital Age

The lessons of 1917 echo loudly today. Consider the way Western governments used intelligence to ‘pre-bunk’ Russian disinformation during the early stages of the Ukraine conflict. By publicly exposing planned provocations, the U.S. and U.K. shaped the narrative before Russia could deploy its own messaging.

Similarly, efforts to attribute cyber operations — like those involving China’s Volt Typhoon — are modern examples of integrating intelligence and strategic comms to pre-empt adversaries, protect infrastructure, and influence international norms.

These campaigns hinge on the same principles that shaped Britain’s response to the Zimmermann Telegram:

The information environment is persistently contested

Operational success is built on cumulative gains from persistent campaigning

Security, intelligence, and communications work best when integrated and aligned to strategic aims

Viewing the case of the Zimmerman Telegram as a German blunder downplays the decades of strategic campaigning in the information environment that meant Britain was positioned to intercept, decrypt, and then exploit the Telegram. Persistent campaigning paid off not just in decrypting a message, but in changing the course of the war.